evidence of growing Japanese influence in the Pacific via financial and monetary channels, rather than primarily via trade flows. But it does not find evidence that the country has taken deliberate steps to establish a Yen Bloc.
PART I: IS A TRADE BLOC FORMING IN PACIFIC ASIA?
We must begin by acknowledging the obvious: the greatly increased economic weight of East Asian countries in the world. The rapid outward-oriented growth of Japan, followed by the four East Asian NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries) and more recently by some of the other ASEAN countries, is one of the most remarkable and widely-remarked trends in the world economy over the last three decades. But when one asks whether a yen bloc is forming in East Asia, one is presumably asking something more than whether the economies are getting larger, or even whether economic flows among them are increasing. One must ask whether the share of intra-regional trade is higher, or increasing more rapidly, than would be predicted based on such factors as the CINP or growth rates of the countries involved.
Adjusting Intra-regional Trade for Growth Table 1 reports three alternative ways of computing intra-regionat trade bias. The first part of the table is based on a àimple breakdown of trade (exports plus imports) undertaken by countries in East Asia into trade with other members of the same regional grouping, versus trade 3 with other parts of the world.4 For comparison, the analogous statistics are reported for Western Europe (the EC Twelve) and for North America (the United States, Canada, and Mexico).
The share of intra-rcgional trade in East Asia increased from 33 per cent in 1980
to 37 per cent in 1989. Pronouncements that a clubbisb trade bloc is forming in the region are usually based on figures such as these. But the numbers are deceptive.
All three regions show increasing intra-group trade in the 1980s. The region that has both the highest and the fastest-increasing degree of intra-regional trade is not Asia but the European Community, reaching 59 per cent in 1989. The share of intra-regional trade in East Asia has not even been increasing appreciably faster than that in North America.
Quite aside from the comparison with Europe, it is easy to be misled by intra-regional trade shares such as those reported in the first three rows of Table 1 . If one allows for the phenomenon that most of the East Asian countries in the 1980s experienced rapid growth inlQtaj output and trade, then it is possihie that there has in fact been no movement toward intraregional bias in the evolving pattern of trade. The increase in the intra-regional share of trade that is observed in Table 1 worldwide increased by only 53 per cent. Even if there continued to be no regional bias in 1989, the observed intra-regional share of trade would have increased by one-third (to 20 % These statistics are presented in more detail in Table I in Frankel, 1991c. 4 [= 1200/5892]) due solely to the greater weight of Asian countries in the world economy.
Consider now the more realistic case where, due to transportation costs if nothing else, countries within each of the three groupings undertake trade that is somewhat hiased toward trading partners within their own group (East Asia, North America, and the European Community toward intra-AsianIrade, the more rapid growth of total trade and output experienced by Asian countries would show up as a rate of growth of intra-Asian trade that was faster than the rate of growth of Asian trade with the rest of the world.
Think of each East Asian country in 1980 as conducting trade with other East Asian firms
in the same proportion as their weight in world trade (15 %) multiplied by a regional bias term to explain the actual share reported in Table 1 (33 96) . Then the regional bias term would have to be 2.18 (=.33/.15). An unchanged regional bias term multiplied by the East Asians ' 1989 weight in world trade would predict that the 1989 intra-regional share of trade would be 44 per cent (2. 18x.20 = .436). The actual intra-regional share, however, did not increase to nearly this level. Thus the East Asian bias toward within-region trade, far from rising, actually diminished in the 1980s1 The implicit intra-regional bias fell to 1.9 (=.37/.20), as shown in the middle rows of Table 1 .
A Test on Bilateral Trade Flows
The analysis should be elaborated by use of a systematic framework for measuring what patterns of bilateral trade are normal around the world; the so-called '1gravity" modeL5 A dummy variable can then be added to represent when both countries in a given pair belong to the same regional grouping, and one can check whether the level and time trend in the East Asia/Pacific grouping exceeds that in other groupings. We do not currently have measures of historical, political, cultural and linguistic ties. Thus it will be possible to interpret the dummy variables as reflecting these factors, rather than necessarily as reflecting discriminatory trade policies. Perhaps we should not regret the merging of these different factors in one term, because as noted there are in any case no overt preferential trading arrangements on which theories of a Japanese trading bloc could rely.6
The dependent variable is trade (exports plus imports), in log form, between pairs of countries in a given year. We have 63 countries in our data set, so that there are 1,953 data points (=63x62/2) fur a given year2 The goal, again, is to see how much of the high level of trade within the East Asian region can be explained by simple economic factors common to bilateral trade throughout the world, and how much is left over to be attributed to a special See Deardorff (1984, pp.503-04) for a survey of the (short) subject of gravity equations.
Krugman (1991) has made a crude first pass at applying the gravity model to the question whether Europe and North America are separate trading btoca, but did not get as far as including other countries, or including a variable for distanre.
There are some miming values (245 in 1985 for example), normally due to levels of trade too small to be recorded. In the 1990 results reported here, Taiwan trade ia missing. Detsila on the countries are given in an Appendix. 6 regional effecL.
One would expect the two most important factors in explaining bilateral trade flows to be the geographical distance between the two countries, and their economic size. These factors are the essence of the gravity model. A large part of the apparent bias toward inn-regional trade is certainly due to simple geographical proximity. Indeed Krugman (l99lb) suggests it may alt be due to proximity so that the three trading blocs are "natural" (as distinct from "unnatural" trading arrangements between distant trading partners such as the United States and Israel). Although the importance of distance and transportation costs is clear, there is not a lot of theoretical guidance on precisely how they should enter. We experiment a bit with functional forms. We also add a dummy "Adjacent" variable to indicate when two countries share a common border.
The equation to be estimated is:
The last four explanatory factors are dummy variables.
Details on the data sources, groupings of countries, method for computing distance., etc, are available on request.
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Entering GNPs in product form is empirically well-established in bilateral trade regressions. it can be easily justified by the modem theory of trade under imperfect competition.5 In addition there is reason to believe that (INP per capita has a positive effect, for a given size: as countries become more developed, they tend to specialize more and to trade more.
The results are reported in Tables 2, 3 , and 4. We found all three variables to be highly significant statistically (> 99% level). The coefficient on the log of distance was about -.56, when the adjacency variable (which is also highly significant statistically) is included at the same time. This means that when the distance between two non-adjacent countries is higher by 1 per cent, the trade between them falls by about .56 per cent,'° We tested for possible non-linearity in the log-distance term, as it could conceivably be the cause of any apparent bias toward intraregional trade that is left after controlling linearly for distance. Quadratic and cubic terms turned out to be not at all significant. We report here only results without them.
The estimated coefficient on ONP per capita is about .29 as of 1980, indicating that richer countries do indeed trade more, though this term declines doring the 1980s, reaching .08 in 1990. The estimated coefficient for the log of the product of the two countries' (3NPs is about .75, indicating that, though trade increases with size, it increases less-than-proportionately (holding GNP per capita constant). This presumably reflects the widely-known pattern that small
The specification implies that trade between two equal-sized countries (say, of size .5) will he greater than trade between a large and small countiy (say, of size .9 and .t). This property of models with imperfect competition is not a property of the classical Heckacher-Ohlin theory of comparative advantage. Helpman (t987) and Helpman and Krugman (t985, section 1.5) . Foundations for the gravity model are ales offered by Anderson (t979) and other papers surveyed by Deardorff (t984, .
" The coefficient on the log of distanre was about .8 when the adjaceiscy variable was not included. 8 economies tend to be more open to international trade than larger, more diversified, economies.
If there were nothing to the notion of trading blocs, then these basic variables would soak up all the explanatory power. There would be nothing left to attribute to a dummy variable representing whether two trading partners are both located in the same region. In this case the level and trend in intra-regional trade would be due solely to the proximity of the countries, and to their rapid rate of overall economic growth. But we found that dummy variables for intra- One possible explanation for the apparent intra-rcgional trade biases within East Asia and°O thers have reported the high volume of trans-Pacific trade. But it has been difficuh to evaluate such statistics when no account is taken of these countrieC collective size. A higher percentage of economic activity in a larger region will consist of intrs-regional than in a smatter region, even when there is no intra-regional bias, merely because smaller regions tend by their nature to trade across their boundaries more than larger ones. In the limit, when the unit is the world, 100 per cent of trade is intra-'regional." 'In tests similar to ours, Hamilton and Winters (1991) found the A5HAN dummy to reflect one of the most significant trading areas io the world.
adding to our gravity model a separate dummy variable for bilateral Asian trade with Japan in particular. It was not even remotely statistically significant in any year, and indeed the point estimate was a small negative number. (The results are not reported in this version of the paper.) Thus there was no evidence that Japan has established or come to dominate a trading bloc in Asia.17
To summarize the most relevant effects, if two countries both lie within the houndaries of APEC, they trade with each other a little over 1 per cent more than they otherwise would.
The nested EAEC bloc is less strong, and has declined a bit in magnitude and significance during the course of the 1980s. The Western Hemisphere and EC blues, hy contrast, intensified rapidly during the decade. Indeed1 by 1990, the Western Hemisphere bloc was stronger than the EAEC bloc, if one takes into account the existence -of the APEC effect. There was never a special Japan effect within Pacific Asia.
In short, beyond the evident facts that countries near each other trade with each other, and that Japan and other Asian countries are growing rapidly, there is no evidence that Japan is concentrating its trade with other Asian countries in any special way, nor that they are collectively moving toward a trade bloc in the way that Western Europe and the Westem Hemisphere appear to be. -We now turn from trade to finance.°T 
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PART IL JAPAN'S FINANCIAL JNFLUENCE IN THE REGION
In the case of financial flows, proximity is less important than it is for trade flows. For some countries the buying and selling of foreign exchange and highly-rated bonds is characterized by the absence of significant government capital controls, transactions costs or information costs. In such cases, there would be no particular reason to expect greater capital flows among close countries than distant ones. Rather, each country would be viewed as depositing into the world capital pool, or borrowing from it, whatever quantity of funds it wished at the going world interest rate. Thus even if we could obtain reliable data on bilateral capital flows (which we cannot), and whatever pattem they happened to show, such statistics would not be particularly interesting.
Tokyo's Influence on Reelonal Financial Markets
Many Asian countries still have substantial capital controls, and financial markets that are in other respects less than fully developed. Even financial markets in Singapore and Hong Kong, the most open in Asia, retain some minor frictions. Where the links with world capital markets are obstructed by even small barriers, it is an interesting question to ask whether those links are stronger with some major financial centers than with others. This question is explored econometrically below.
Information costs exist for equities, and for bonds with some risk of default. These costs may be smaller for those investors who are physically, linguistically, and culturally close to the nation where the borrower resides. Proximity clearly matters as well in the case of direct 15 investment, in part because much of direct investment is linked to trade, in part because linguistic and cultural proximity matter for direct investment.
Forei2n Direct Investment Furthermore, Ramstetter (1991a, p.95-96; 1991b, p.8-9) has forcefully pointed out that the standard Ministry of Finance figures on Japanese foreign direct investment actually represent statistics on investment either approved by or reported to the government, and greatly overstate the extent of true Japanese investment in developing countries. The more accurate balance of see also Koroiya and Wakssugi (1991) .
Nigel Holloway, 'Half-full, half empty, Far Eastern Economic Review, December 1991, p-69. 16 payments data from the Bank of Japan show a smaller percentage of investment going to Asia.
Tokvct vs. New York Effects on Asian Interest Rates
Statistics also exist on Japanese portfolio investment. But, in the case of portfolio capital, looking at quantity data is not as informative as looking at price data --that in, at interest rates.
For one thing, the quality of the data on interest rates is much higher than the quality of the data on capital flows. These include Otani and Tiwari (t981), Ito (1986) , and Fran]cel (1984) . The interest rates in the calculations are covered on the forward eschange or Eurocurreney markets so as to avoid exchange risk. [Teats that took at real or uncovered interest differentiala, rather than covered interest differentials, include Ito (19St) and Fukeo and
Okubaj
The frequently large negative covered differential that had heen observed for Australia up to mid-1983 mid- (see, e.g., Argy, 1987 (Hong Kong has long had open capital markets. Singapore undertook a major liberalization in 1978, though it has tried to segment its domestic money market from its offshnre "Asia dollar market. 't23) Malaysia has officially liberalized following Singapore,24 though its covered differential has remained considerably higher.
We can apply a simple test to the hypothesis that a particular Asian country is dominated financially by Japan, versus the alternative hypothesis that ties to capital markets in the other industrialized countries are equally strong. We run the following OLS regression to see how the interest rate in a typical Asian country depends on interest rates in Tokyo and New York.
Under the null hypothesis that the country's financial markets are insufficiently developed or liberalized to be directly tied to any foreign financial markets, the coefficients on foreign interest rates should be zero. Under the alternative hypothesis that the country's financial markets are closely tied to those in Tokyo, the coefficient on Tokyo interest rates should be closer to 1 than to 0; and similarly for New York.25 Table 6 presents estimates for three-month interest rates in Hong Kong and Singapore.
For the Hong Kong interest rate, the influence of the New York market appears very strong.
See MOreOO (198 8) . Fdwards and Khsn (1985) includes another test of covered interest parity for Singapore.
Abdd;n (1986) and Gtick and Hutchison (1990, p.4S) .° It ahoold be noted that if eapitat markets in Tokyo and New York are closely tied to each other, as they indeed are, then msltteollioearity might make it difficolt to obtain statistically significant estimates. But this does oot mean that there is anything wrong with the test. A finding that the coefficient 00 the Tokyo interest rate is statistically greater tItan 0, or than the coefficient on the New York interest rate, remains valid. This is not surprising; not only does the Colony have open financial markets, but its currency has since October 1983 been pegged to the U.S. dollar," so that there is nothing to inhibit perfect arbitrage between its interest rates and U.S. interest rates. Neither Tokyo, London, nor Frankfurt, has significant influence in Hong Kong on average over the sample period (from 1976 to 1989) . For the Singapore interest rate, the influence of New York is again very significant; but now there is also a significant, though smaller, weight on Tokyo. The evidence suggests that both countries have had open financial markets ever since the mid-1970s, with New York having the dominant influence, but with Tokyo also having a one-quarter effect in the case of Singapore.
To see whether the influence of the foreign financial centers changed over the course of the sample period, we can allow for time trends in the coefficients, also reported in Table 6 . When local interest rates are regressed against foreign interest rates, the U.S. is the dominant influence in each of the four East Asian NICs, though the Japanese interest rate is also statistically significant in Korea and Singapore. In Australia and New Zealand, only the British interest rate is important. (The Japanese interest rate actually appears with the wrong sign, as does the U.S. interest rate in the case of New Zealand.) When the regressions are run on first differences (rather than levels), as they probably should be, the significance levels fall sharply.
In the case of Singapore, the U.S. interest rate is still the dominant influence, but the results for the others are less clear.
We can add an interactive time trend to see if the foreign influences change over the sample period. The United Kingdom is tosing influence in Hong Kong, where the U.S. gains at its expense, and Singapore, where Japan is the one to gain at the U.K. 's expense. More surprisingly, Japan appears to be losing influence in Taiwan, at the expense of Germany, and in Korea and Australia, at the expense of the U.K. Again, when these tests are run on first differences, significance levels disappear. During most of the sample period, financial markets in most of these countries were insufficiently liberalized to respond to foreign interest rates, regardless of nationality. Table 7 analyzes the determination of interest rates in five Pacific countries with monthly data for l9S8-91, a time period more recent than that in Table 6 , There is more evidence of an important role on the part of Tokyo than there was in the earlier period. For Singapore, where the influence of Tokyo in Table 6 was less than New York but rising over time, estimates in the first row, based simply on interest rates, suggest that the Japanese financial center has now surpassed its American rival. For Taiwan, Tokyo dominates so strongly that New York doesn't even seem to matter. For Hong Kong and Australia, on the other hand, New York dominates. For Korea, the two major financial centers appear to be 21 equally strong.
As noted above, a country could have close financial ties with a foreign country and yet if exchange rate changes are important, the simple regression agaiost the foreign interest rate would be inappropriately designed to show this relationship. We can take out currency factors by using the forward exchange market. We simply express the foreign interest rates so as to be "covered5 or hedged against exchange risk. Doing so in Table 7 changes the results for Australia and Singapore toward a Tokyo effect that is smaller than the New York effect.2t (Usable forward rate data are not available for the other countries.)
For four of these countries, there exists another way of correcting for possible exchange rate changes: direct data on forecasts of market participants collected in a monthly survey by the Currency Forecaster's Digest of White Plains, N.Y." One advantage of using the survey responses tn measure expected exchange rate changes is that the data allow us to test explicitly whether there exists an exchange risk premium that creates art international differential in interest rates even in the absence of barriers to intemational capital flows. Such a differential would be compensation to risk-averse investors for holding assets that they view as risky.5° An For the case of Australia, the coefficient on the covered foreign interest rate is close enough to 1 to constitute statistical support of the hypothesis that 'covered interest parity' holds. That is, capital controls and other barciera to the movement of capital between Sydney and New York are close to zero. ('lie Durbin-wataon statistics improve substantially when the forward rates are included, confirming that the equation that uses covered interest rates is a more appropriate specification.)
The Currency Forecasters' Direst data is proprietary, and was obtained by suhacription by the Institute for Interaatinnal Economics, a The forward rate data allow us to eliminate factors associated with the currency in which countries' assets are denominated, but they do not sllnw us to distinguish between two currency factore the exchange risk premium and expectations of depreciation. Fur the case of Australia, for example, the support for covered interest parity suggests that barriers to the movement of capital between Sydney sad New York are low, and so differences in interest rates are due to currency factors. But when the Australian interest rate is observed to exceed the U.S. interest rate, is this because the Australian dollar is confidently expected to depreciate, or is it because investors have no idea what the exchange rate will do aid demand so be compensated for this risk? The survey data may be 22 advantage of the Currency Forecasters' Digest data in particular is that they are available even for countries like Taiwan and Korea where financial markets are less developed. A potential disadvantage is the possibility that survey data measure the expectations of marker participants imperfectly.
For Singapore, the survey data corroborate the finding from the forward rate data that, once expected depreciation is eliminated as a factor, the New York effect dominates the Tokyo effect. For Korea, the survey data also show that the Tokyo effect becomes smaller than the New York effect. For Australia and Taiwan, both effects largely disappear.
The Role of the Yen in AsiaxLExdhnngeE.afeYolicies
The finding that eliminating exchange rate expectations from the calculation leaves Tokyo with relatively little effect on local interest rates in most of these countries does not mean that the Japanese influence is not strong. It is likely, rather, that much of the influence in the Pacific comes precisely through the role of the yen. If Pacific countries assign high weight to the yen in setting their exchange rate policies, then their interest rates will be heavily influenced by Japanese interest rates.
No Asian or Pacific countries have ever pegged their currencies to the yen in the postwar period. But neither are there any Pacific countries that the International Monetary Fund classifies as still pegging to the U.S. dollar. (As already mentioned, Hong Kong pegs to the dollar; but the Colony is not an official member of the IMF.) Malaysia and Thailand, and a number of Pacific island countries, officially peg to a basket of major currencies and are thought able to distinguish between these two hypotheses, whereas the forward rate data cansot.
to give weight to both the dollar and yen, but the weights are not officially announced.
It is interesting to estimate econometrically the weights given to the dollar, yen, and other major currencies in exchange rate policies of Asian/Pacific countries, especia1l those who follow a basket peg but do not officially announce the weights. This involves regressing changes in the value of the currency in question against changes in the value of the yen, dollar, etc.
There is a methodological question of what numeraire should be used to measure the value of the currencies. A simple solution is to use the SDR as numeraire. This approach suffers from the drawback that the SDR is itself a basket of five major currencies including the dollar and yen. An alternative approach that is a little neater theoretically is to use purchasing power over local goods (the inverse of the local price level) as the numeraire. Whatever the numeraire, under the null hypothesis that a particular currency is pegged to the dollar or yen, or to a weighted basket, the regression results should show this clearly, featuring even a high R2. We focus here on the purchasing power measure. Overall, however, the numbers bear out Hong Kong's peg to the dollar.
Regressions of changes in the real value of the Malaysian ringgit against the five major currencies, reported in Table Ba, give a large significant weight to the dollar. Some sub-periods show a significant weight on the mark, and during 1986-88 even the pound is significant. But the yen is not significant during any three-year sub-period. The constant term is negative (and statistically significant), indicating a trend depreciation, and the R5 is fairly low, indicating that the basket "peg" was loose (even if one allows for a crawling peg).5'
The Singapore dollar shows significant weights (of about . 
The Role of the Yen In Reserves anti Invoicing
There is other evidence that the yen is playing an increasing role in the region. As Tahie 9 shows, Asian central banks in the course of the 1980s increased their holdings of yen from 13.9 per cent of their foreign exchange reserve portfolios to 17.1 per cent.53 Foreign exchange market trading in the regional financial centers of Singapore and Hong Kong, though still overwhelmingly conducted in dollars, now shows a much higher proportion of trading in yen than is the case in Europe.
The yen is also being used more widely to invoice lending and trade in Asia. The countries that incurred large international debts in the 1970s and early 19 SOs subsequently shifted
The results for the won are reported in Frankel (1992) , [With value measured in terms or purchasing power. Value is measured also in terms of the 501k in a related paper to be pubtished by the Hoover Institution, but the regreaaiona are against the dollar and yen alone.J ' The deutsche mark and Swiss franc are the two currencies that suffered the largest loss in share in the regioa Tavias and Oseki (1992, p.35) . the composition away from dollar-denominated debt and toward yen-denominated debt. Table   9 shows that the yen share among five major Asian debtors nearly doubled between 1980 and 1988, entirely at the expense of the dollar. Table 10 shows that the share of trade denominated in yen is greater in Southeast Asia than in other regions, and that was an especially rapid increase from 1983 to 1990 in the share of Southeast Asian imports denominated in yenY PART ifi: CONCLUSIONS We may draw eight conclusions.
(1) The 1e4 of trade in East Asia, like trade within the European Community and within the Western Hemisphere, is biased toward intraregional trade, to a greater extent than can be explained naturally by distance. By way of contrast to Krugman's natura1 trade blocs, one might call these three regions "super-natural" blocs. (1991, 92) give further statistics and discussion. 27 being shut out of a strong Asian bloc centered on Japan, the United States and Canada are in the enviable position of belonging to bQth of the world's two strongest groupings.
(7) There is more evidence of rising Japanese influence in the East Asia's financial markets than is the case for trade. Tokyo appears to have recently acquired a dominant influence over interest rates in Singapore and Taiwan. lt also has important and increasing effects on interest rates elsewhere in the Pacific, though overall its influence is as yet no greater than that of New York. (8) Some of Japan's financial influence takes place through a growing role for the yen, at the expense of the dollar. There has been a gradual increase in the yen's relative importance in invoicing of trade and finance in the region, and in some countries' exchange rate policies.
This still leaves a question raised at the beginning of this essay. Are the financial and monetary trends the outcome of deliberate policy measures on the part of Japan? Graduallyincreasing use of the yen intemationally is primarily the outcome of private decisions by importers, exporters, borrowers and lenders. It is difficult to see signs of deliberate policy actions taken by the Japanese govemment to increase its financial and monetary influence in Asia. To the contrary, at least until recently, the Japanese government has resisted any tendency for the yen to become an international currency in competition with the dollar.
It has been the U.S. government, in the Yen/Dollar Agreement of 1984 and in subsequent negotiations, that has been pushing Japan to internationalize the yen, to promote its worldwide use in trade, finance, and central bank policies.36 It has also been the U.S. government that has been pushing Korea and other East Asian NICs to open up their financial markets, thereby 3' Frankel (1984) .
allowing Japanese capital and Japanese financial institutions to enter these countries. It has again been the U.S. government that has been pushing Korea and Taiwan ' Balassa and Williamson (1987) , Noland (1990) and Frankel (1959) . Financial negotiations betweesi the U.S.
Treasury and the governments o( Korea and Taiwan were a response to congressional passage of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill. Frankel (1991c) .
(2) computed as the ratio of (1) to shares of world trade, as described in text.
(3) Gravity regressions, reported in Tables 2, 3 , and 4, respectively. They include also significant coefficients on the APEC bloc, among other variables. 
